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In order to evaluate the allocational effectiveness of regional policy when harmonizing regional economic conditions 
firms’ preferences play a pivot role. If harmonization hinders risk diversification of the firm, then instead of regional 
diversification of capital agglomeration of capital occurs. Hence, regional policy will not achieve its objective to equal 
the spatial allocation of capital. 
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There is a growing interest towards the harmonization of economic conditions
and standard of living in di®erent regions of a country or an economic union.
The question of the appropriate regional policy approach in this direction is
most important. Political reasoning often argues that the market solution
promotes the concentration of capital to some regions. Therefore, regional
policy is urged to provide a higher degree of economic integration leading to
a more equal spatial allocation of capital.
The literature in regional economics has developed a fundamental interest
in the spatial allocation of resources and the role of their agglomeration to
some regions (Porter, 1990; Krugman, 1991; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables,
1999). In particular, welfare aspects of capital agglomeration (P°Ä uger and
SÄ udekum, 2007), the location decisions of ¯rms (Pontes, 2005; Pontes/Parr
2005) and the economics of the induction of a clustering process (Raines,
2001) have been subject to thorough investigation stressing, among other
things, the importance of spatial economies of scale and scope.
Our paper concentrates on the interaction between the spatial allocation
of capital and the regional policy approach of harmonization. In a two-region
country we study the optimal regional share of investment of a risk averse
¯rm. Regional policy a®ects the ¯rm's decision-making. When harmonizing
regional economic conditions through political activities optimum regional
investments of the ¯rm reacts according to its risk preferences. A higher
correlation of risky regional business costs, for example, causes barriers to
diversi¯cation. As a result agglomeration of capital to one region may occur
2although the regional policy approach focuses on the diversi¯cation of capital
across the regions.
We formulate a model to demonstrate our claim that whether or not
harmonizing regional economic conditions in terms of a higher similarity
of risky regional business costs will make capital allocation regionally more
dispersed than concentrated depends crucially upon the ¯rm's prudence or
risk aversion elasticity. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 provides the model and section 3 derives a symmetry result of
regional investments. Section 4 presents the main results about the impact
of risk preferences upon the asymmetry of regional investments. Section 5
concludes.
2. Optimum regional investment
A ¯rm, located in a two-region country, has I units of capital endowment
which would earn a riskless return R from investment in either region. Let ~ t1
and ~ t2 be random costs of doing business in region 1 and 2, respectively, in
this two-region country. Random cost di®erences are based, for example, on
di®erent productivities, business environment, industrial policy, regulations,
¯scal and tax policies which lead to random di®erences in the rates of return
of the regions. Let us model the business costs of the ¯rm such that (1 ¡ ~ ti)
is retained as the uncertain net return per unit of investment in region i(i =
1;2).
Consider a risk averse ¯rm. The stochastic income of the ¯rm, ~ Y , comes
from doing business in both regions, where x denotes the share of investment
3capital that goes to region 1. Hence
~ Y = [(1 ¡ ~ t1)x + (1 ¡ ~ t2)(1 ¡ x)]RI: (1)
The ¯rm maximizes expected utility of income, U(Y ), with respect to
capital share x invested in region 1:
max
x EU(~ Y ); (2)
where E represents the expectation operator and positive marginal utility of
income, U0(Y ) > 0, is strictly decreasing, ¡U00(Y ) > 0. Capital share (1¡x)
goes to region 2.
The ¯rst-order condition for the optimum capital share x to region 1 in
the investment problem (2) reads:
EU
0(~ Y )(~ t2 ¡ ~ t1) = 0: (3)
We assume the optimum share to satisfy 0 < x · 1.
First, we study the impact of di®erences in expected business costs across
regions upon equal capital allocation to both regions. Second, we investigate
the e®ect of the correlation of business costs upon regional investment al-
location. Suppose, regional policy of the government is intended to have
regional business costs moving in a more similar fashion, i.e. some kind of
harmonization of economic conditions of location. Does this lead to more
integration or to more specialization of the regions? In other words, do we
have more diversi¯cation or more agglomeration of capital in the country?
We will show that policy outcomes depend upon the risk aversion elasticity
of risky business costs di®erences.
43. Symmetry of regional investments
As an illustration of the aim of our investigation consider former Western
and Eastern Germany and today's federal and local governments' regional
economic policy. We observe many political initiatives intending to harmo-
nize regional standard of living. What are the conditions under which ¯rms
have an incentive to diversify investments across regions?
In our study, we will argue that most important are regional di®erences
in the costs from doing business. Therefore, we disregard the magnitude of
regional transactions costs and introduce the following constraint.






Remark: In order to motivate and to describe the meaning of assumption
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By using equation (4), let us di®erentiate expected utility of income EU(~ Y ) ´
Z with respect to capital share x to region 1. If we evaluate the result at
point x = 1















(~ t2 ¡ ~ t1)
t U
0(RI)(¹2 ¡ ¹1); (5)
¹i = E~ ti (i = 1;2). Hence regional investments are symmetric if and only if
expected business costs across regions do not di®er.
The following result reveals the importance of the costs di®erential be-
tween regions.
5Proposition 1. Assume condition (A1) to hold. If expected business
costs are identical between regions, then optimum regional investment allo-
cation is symmetric, i.e. x = 1=2. If expected business costs di®er between
regions, than the region with the lower expected costs gets the higher capital
share.
Proof. From the ¯rst-order condition (3) we obtain
EU
0(~ Y )(¹2 ¡ ¹1) = ¡cov(U
0(~ Y );~ t2 ¡ ~ t1): (6)
Observe that under condition (A1), the de¯nition of the ¯rm's income (4)
and the fact that marginal utility of income U0 is continuously di®erentiable
we obtain sign(x ¡ 1=2) = sign(¹2 ¡ ¹1): And the claim follows.
Expected business costs ¹i can be interpreted as re°ecting some sort of
regional di®erences or comparative disadvantages of region i. For example,
¹1 < ¹2 implies that there is an intrinsic bias in favor of investing in region
1. Given the impact of the costs di®erential between regions, the magni-
tude of the asymmetry of optimum capital allocation to both regions also
depends upon the degree of ¯rm's risk aversion and the ¯rm's assessment of
the probability distribution of its business costs.
4. Diversi¯cation vs. agglomeration of capital
In what follows we investigate on the interaction between the degree of asym-
metry of regional capital allocation and the harmonization of regional eco-
nomic conditions by government policy. If political activities are such that
risky business costs behave more similar, i.e. are more correlated, does this
6support capital diversi¯cation across regions? Or, does such policy encourage
regional agglomeration of capital?
Suppose regional policy induces harmonization of the economic environ-
ment such that risky regional business costs are more correlated. Other things
being equal, this implies that the variance of the business costs di®erential
~ t2¡~ t1 is decreasing. More generally, let us consider a mean preserving shrink
of risky regional business costs, in order to study the e®ect of the degree of
stochastic similarity between regional business costs upon optimum regional
investments. We introduce the following de¯nitions.
De¯nition (D1). Let ~ ¢ ´ ~ t2¡~ t1 denote the risky business costs di®erential
between regions 2 and 1 and let ¢ = ¹2 ¡¹1 indicate its expected value. Be
~ ¢s a mean preserving shrink of risky costs di®erential ~ ¢.
De¯nition (D2). Let P(Y ) =
U000(Y )
¡U00(Y )Y denote relative prudence (Kimball,
1990).
The following result reports the relationsship between the degree of allo-
cational asymmetry and the harmonization of regional economic conditions.
Proposition 2. Be ¢ > 0, i.e. x > 1=2: A mean preserving shrink in the
risky regional business costs di®erential leads to less asymmetry of regional
investments, i.e. x decreases, if and only if relative prudence exceeds 2.
Remark: One may consider as a benchmark of the ¯rm's utility function
the generalized logarithmic utility function U(Y ) = Y +° log(Y ); ° > 0. This
utility function exhibits P(Y ) = 2 (Battermann, Broll, and Wahl, 2007).
Proof. From Proposition 1 we have sign(x ¡ 1=2) = sign¢. Let f(z) =
zU0(z): By using de¯nition (D2) we get signf00(z) = sign(P(z) ¡ 2): Hence,
7from the ¯rst-order condition (3) and de¯nition (D1) we obtain sign(P(Y )¡
2) = ¡signEU0(~ Y )~ ¢s: In order to satisfy the ¯rst-order condition optimum
capital share x invested in region 1 before the shrink must be adjusted. x
declines as result of a mean preserving shrink if and only if P(Y ) > 2. And
the claim follows.
Proposition 2 reveals that preferences of the ¯rm play a pivot role when
one evaluates the e®ectiveness of regional policy upon capital allocation. Re-
garding the aim of harmonizing economic environments in di®erent regions
preferences determine whether or not diversi¯cation of capital occurs. Re-
gional policy a®ects the probability distribution of regional business costs. If
political measures turn out to destroy stochastic di®erences they also change
incentives for regional investments. Given speci¯c preferences of the ¯rms
such policy creates barriers to diversi¯cation. As a result regional agglom-
eration of capital will occur although the objective of regional policy is the
opposite.
To work out the economic intuition behind Proposition 2 we relate our
¯nding to the framework of two-moment decision models (Meyer, 1987). This
allows us to apply the notion of elasticity.
Corollary. Suppose a mean preserving shrink in the costs di®erential.
Then (in)elastic risk aversion leads to diversi¯cation (agglomeration) of re-
gional investments. Capital allocation is una®ected if and only if preferences
exhibit unit elastic risk aversion.
Proof. sign(P(Y ) ¡ 2) = sign(" ¡ 1), where " denotes the elasticity of
risk aversion (Broll, Wahl, and Wong, 2006).
8It is common in the literature to study economic e®ects of policy measures
under the presumption that important variables are related by a regression.
To undertake such an investigation let us introduce the following relationship.
Assumption (A2). Suppose that regional business costs are correlated such
that ~ t1 = ® + ¯~ t2 + ~ u; whereE(~ ujt2) = 0:
Remark: There exists a systematic relationship between risky regional
business costs ~ t1 and ~ t2, although the linear relation is obscured by an uncor-
related noise ~ u with zero mean. Note that E(~ ujt2) = 0 implies cov(~ t2; ~ u) = 0,
since E(~ t2~ u) = E[~ t2E(~ ujt2)]:
The following result reports how a harmonization of regional economic
conditions a®ects the degree of asymmetry of regional investments.
Proposition 3. If the level of relative risk aversion of the ¯rm's utility
function does not exceed unity, then given regression (A2) the asymmetry of
optimum regional capital allocation reduces when regional policy harmonizes
business costs (i.e., ¯ increases).
Proof. Let A(Y ) =
¡U00(Y )
U0(Y ) denote absolute risk aversion. Then implicit




= signEfA(~ Y )~ Y ¡ 1 ¡ A(~ Y )(1 ¡ ~ t2)RIgU
0(~ Y )~ t2: (7)
Since A(~ Y )(1¡~ t2)RI > 0, the overall term in brackets f:::g is negative if the
level of relative risk aversion A(Y )Y does not exceed unity. And the claim
follows.
Under our regressional condition improving regional policy coordination
brings the country closer to full diversi¯cation and, therefore, closer to sym-
9metry of regional investments. The reason is that in the ¯rst place an increase
in regression parameter ¯ decreases the regional business costs di®erential.
This makes region 1 less attractive compared with region 2. On the other
hand, barriers to diversi¯cation evolve since business costs are more corre-
lated. If preferences do not exceed a critical level of relative risk aversion the
net e®ect of regional policy is in favor of the harmonization target.
Note, however, that according to empirical studies (see, e.g., Friend and
Blume, 1975), coe±cients of relative risk aversion are typically in excess of
one. Hence, at some point, agglomeration of capital will occur although
regional policy is aimed to harmonize economic conditions. The reason be
that the advantage of a lower business costs di®erential is overcompensated
by the disadvantage of reduced diversi¯cation opportunities of the ¯rms.
4. Concluding remarks
An interesting question that has been raised in the context of economic inte-
gration is whether or not regional policy, for example, the cluster approach,
will promote mobility of capital in order to achieve economic e±ciency and
stability in a country. Our paper shows that greater economic integration
between regions induces only under speci¯c conditions investment decisions
of capital to be more geogra¯cally concentrated than diversi¯ed.
It is reasonable to argue that given historical conditions certain regions
may have natural advantages in attracting capital investments. For exam-
ple, lower expected transaction costs in doing business in one region can be
interpreted as an intrinsic regional advantage to attract capital.
10Our modelling starts with an economic setting in which there exists an
initial attractiveness for capital investments to a speci¯c region. Whether or
not economic integration gets magni¯ed by regional policy approaches like
the harmonization of economic conditions depends primarily upon the ¯rms'
preferences. The intended symmetry of regional investments may not be
achieved by regional policy because ¯rms have an incentive to concentrate
investments in one region as a reaction of harmonization measures. There-
fore, the agglomeration of capital is endogenous. We argue that barriers to
diversi¯cation hinder to equal the spatial allocation of capital.
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